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BAR BRIEFS

in Chicago to be a reasonable regulation of enterprise "affected with a

punlic interest;" because the Chicago elevators occupied a strategic
position to take a "virtual monopoly" toll from an important volume of
commerce in agricultural products. The condition which warranted the

regulation of rates seemed to be the fact that a virtual monopoly in an
imp~ortant service did exist, or was seriously threatened.
State regulation of railroads has been sustained on the ground that
the railroads are engaged in a public employment affecting the public
interest and are subject to legislative control by their charters.
Insurance business was held to be "affected with a public interest"
on the ground that insurance so far affects the public welfare as to
invoke and require governmental regulation. Banking business was
also held to be subject to regulation.

In the Wolff Packing Company cases, the Kansas Industrial Court
held that it had the power to regulate the wages paid to the employees
of the meat packing company. But the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the Industrial Court did not have the power to regulate

wages of these employees, on the ground that this industry "was not
affected with a public interest."

It is practically impossible to generalize about characteristics of
"public interest" enterprises. In determining what constitutes a public
use, legislation cannot be depended upon. Precedents are of little avail

for what is today a public use may not be tomorrow, but each case must
be decided upon its facts.-Michigan Law Review.

A UTILITARIAN TEST FOR CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

By

ANDERSON WOODS

The legitimate social reactions to crime are three: (1) direct restraint
of the offender himself from further misdeeds; (2) moral education
of the offender directed toward his reformation, or cure; (3) punishment, with a view to deterrence from crime, not only of the particular
offender, but as well of other persons unlawfully disposed.
Punishment has for its primary end, deterrence. A lawbreaker is
put into prison only if it is desirable to deter him as well as others
through fear of the penalty. "Only the so-called responsible can, under
the law, be punished." One who is not sufficiently subject to deterrence
or intimidation by fear of the penalty so as to overcome his impulse to
act, is irresponsible.
"When punishment is not useful and necessary in the combatting
of evils worse than itself, it is wicked and cruel." Though this view
may be said to do away with a deterrence of others similarly inclined,
in effect it does not; as those individuals know that they are in a class
which would be punished in a like situation; as they are responsible.
One theory is that irresponsibility cannot exist without mental
disease. Legislatures merely specify a disease which takes away the
knowledge of right and wrong. If this knowledge amounts to knowing
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that a certain action is condemned, then only a half-wit would come
under the line. It may mean a real moral consciousness.
To be deterred by the law, fear of it as well as knowledge of it is
necessary. Non-intimidability, the test of irresponsibility, may be the
result of nerve lesion or bad education. This may be treated as a disease
no matter how it arises.
The prospective law-breaker may be one who has sufficient doubts
of the certainty of the law's operation in regard to a specific matter
that he will not be deterred. If he is intimidable to such extent that a
fear of punishment, no matter how certain, will not deter him, then he
is irresponsible, but if the law merely has failed to inspire him with a
sufficient fear of punishment to deter him, then he is responsible. The
efficiency of the legal machinery largely determines the success of
deterring those who are responsible. The church, the school and the
home are also responsible.
It is suggested that the following be adopted as a rule of jurisprudence: "If at the time of committing the act there was present in
the mind of the actor a well founded hope of escaping the penalty
prescribed therefor by law, but for which hope he would not have committed the act, he is to be held responsible, otherwise irresponsible."
The "penalty" in this rule is that irreducible deprivation necessary for
deterrence. The indeterminate sentence if it has the deterrence penalty
as a minimum should not be done away with ; as it is an effective restraint
and cure as distinguished from punishment. Further deprivation may
be justified as in the case of the habitual criminal who is unaffected by
the fear of punishment. They are irresponsible and fit subjects for the
care and observation of moral psychologists. "Well founded hope" in
this rule should be given its every day meaning.-Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology.
The American Law Institute announces that for some time it has
considered the question of drafting certain private law statutes, especially those designed to correct defects in the present law as it has been
obliged to state it in the Restatement. In connection with the drafting
of these private law statutes, emphasis was placed on the desirability of
cooperation with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, and as linked with the importance of securing their adoption
by state legislatures, of the cooperation of the American Bar Association.
The Conference of Commissioners and the Council of the Institute
have entered into an agreement that each organization shall notify the
other of the acts which it desires to draft where it is believed the present
law may be defective. The Council of the Institute has entered into
similar cooperative agreement with the Law Revision Commission of
the State of New York.
Three members
Murphy of Fargo, I.
of Devils Lake and
sented at the annual

of our association have passed away recently, Matt
f{. Breaw of Minot and B. D. Townsend, formerly
Fargo. Suitable memorials for them will be premeeting.
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